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INTRODUCTION
I was particularly pleased to have been invited to present the
1997 Vernon Clancey Memorial Lecture because of the
links between the Air Accidents Investigation Branch
(AAIB) and the laboratories where Vernon spent much of
his professional career. It is perhaps ® tting therefore that I
should be presenting a lecture on a subject that he would
have been intimately familiar with. When I joined the AAIB
22 years ago, the aircraft sabotage cases of the 1950s and
60s were still in the forefront of our memory. Vernon
Clancey had worked with us on those investigations and it
was his expertise that was directly associated with
establishing the causes of those events. I did not have the
privilege of working with Vernon but I have worked with
his successors at the same laboratories on a number of
occasions, one of which is the subject of tonight’ s lecture.
This presentation is based upon the technical investiga-
tion conducted by the AAIB in the aftermath of the
Lockerbie disaster. The investigation was focused on
understanding the mechanisms that led to the structural
failure of the Boeing 747 in ¯ ight and resulted in the AAIB
making safety recommendations to provide future aircraft
with enhanced protection from improvised explosive
devices. The AAIB’ s investigation therefore concentrated
on the ¯ ight safety issues, not on the events that led to the
device being placed on the aircraft, which were and are the
subject of a criminal investigation. The AAIB report was
published on 11 September 1990. This lecture reviews the
evidence presented in that report and looks at the develop-
ments that have taken place in response to the safety
recommendationsmade in the reportÐ developments that are
enhancing our understanding of the effects of detonating an
explosive devicewithin an aircraft’ s pressurized fuselage and
showing us the way to mitigate them.
PAN AM FLIGHT 103Ð 21 DECEMBER 1988
At 19:03hrs UTC on 21 December 1998 Pan American
World Airways Flight PA 103 from London, Heathrow to
Kennedy Airport, New York was receiving its oceanic
clearance from Shanwick Oceanic Control. Seconds later
the secondary radar return disappeared from the controller’ s
screen and multiple primary radar returns were seen to fan
out in an easterly direction for a considerable distance.
An improvised explosive device (IED) had detonated in
the forward baggage compartment of the Boeing 747 at
station 700. The structural damage to the aircraft forward
fuselage caused the forward section of the aircraft to detach
and pivot to the right around the window belt on the right
side. The nose section of the aircraft struck the No. 3 engine
intake causing the engine to detach from its pylon. This
element of the structural break-up was complete within
three seconds of the detonation of the device. The aircraft
then entered a steepening descent path with the forward
fuselage structure detaching until it reached a vertical
descent at some 19,000 feet over the town of Lockerbie. At
about this time the tail surfaces of the aircraft started to
disintegrate, probably by a ¯ utter mode, and as a conse-
quence the rear fuselage started the break-up. A large section
of cabin ¯ oor and baggage hold from the rear fuselage
together with three landing gear units fell onto a residential
area in Lockerbie. The main wing structure struck the
ground a short distance away, destroying a bungalow and
creating a huge crater in the ground. There was a very strong
westerly wind at the time of the accident (115 knots at the
aircraft’ s cruising altitude of 31,000 feet). These winds
produced a wreckage trail that stretched from Lockerbie in
the south west of Scotland to the east coast of northern
England, some 80 miles away. The recorded primary radar
returns showed debris falling over the east coast of northern
England more than one hour after the initiating event.
All 259 passengers and crew on board the aircraft were
killed and 11 residents of Lockerbie lost their lives as the
wreckage fell onto the town.
At the time of the disaster it was dark and the initial
emergency service response was concentrated in and around
the town of Lockerbie. The area to the east of Lockerbie is
sparsely populated and includes one of the largest man-
made forests in Europe, the Kielder Forest. The police had
initially identi® ed some seven major wreckage sites in or
near the town and the rescue teams set about the task of
recovering bodies whilst at the same time preserving
essential evidence for the criminal and technical investiga-
tions. Increasingly it became clear that wreckage was being
discovered at greater and greater distances from Lockerbie
and the eventual wreckage and evidential trail was
established to have covered an area of 840 square miles.
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THE TECHNICAL INVESTIGATION
From the start of the investigation into the causes of the
Lockerbie disaster, the police and the AAIB were consider-
ing two possible scenarios. The ® rst involved sabotage,
which would obviously have resulted in the police
conducting a criminal investigation. The second, that the
aircraft had been destroyed by defects in the aircraft
structure, which would have resulted in the AAIB taking the
lead in an investigation under the Civil Aviation (Investiga-
tion of Air Accidents) Regulations.On 26 December a small
section of baggage container was recovered from the open
countryside to the east of Lockerbie. This piece of wreckage
showed evidence of being in the vicinity of detonating high
explosive. Forensic examinations conducted on 26/27
December con® rmed the initial ® ndings and the world was
noti® ed of these facts in a press release on 28 December. At
that time the AAIB decided that the technical investigation,
conducted under the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air
Accidents) Regulations, required clear boundaries to ensure
that no con¯ ict arose with the criminal investigation. It was
decided that the AAIB investigation would determine the
position of the device within the aircraft, the sequence of
structural failures that led to the break-up of the Boeing 747,
and consider what safety action could be recommended to
provide the aircraft with enhanced protection against
explosive devices. The technical investigationwas therefore
able to concentrate on the aviation safety aspects arising out
of this disaster whilst at the same time assisting and
supporting the criminal investigation being conducted by
the police.
The initial AAIB team of ten accident investigators
arrived in Lockerbie at 01.30hrs., some six hours after the
accident occurred. Over that ® rst night they started to assess
the task ahead and co-ordinate their activities with the
police. In the days that followed the disaster the numbers of
agencies and personnel increased to peak at around 2000
personnel working on the accident site. On the day after the
disaster the AAIB arranged for the Royal Air Force to ¯ y a
series of photographic reconnaissance missions in an
attempt to establish the boundaries of the wreckage trail.
It quickly became clear that there were in fact two wreckage
trails (Figure 1). One, the `northern trail’ , was bounded at its
western end by the town of Lockerbie where a number of
large sections of aircraft structure and three of its engines
fell. This trail extended to the east by some 15 km. The
second trail, `the southern trail’ , was far longer and
stretched from the site of the initial explosion, south of
Lockerbie, to the east coast of northern England some 80
miles away. These very long wreckage trails were a result of
the upper level winds on the evening of 21 December which
were from the west at 115 knots at ¯ ight level 310 (31000
feet), the cruising altitude of the aircraft prior to the
explosion taking place. The ® rst priority for the technical
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Figure 1. Plot of wreckage trails.
investigation was to identify and record the position of all
the items of wreckage over the very long wreckage trail.
This was done with the aid of military photographic
interpreters and large teams on the ground who examined,
identi® ed and recorded each piece of wreckage.
FLIGHT RECORDER EVIDENCE
The aircraft’ s Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit
Voice Recorder (CVR) were recovered some 15 hours after
the accident and returned to the AAIB replay and analysis
facility at Farnborough together with the radar, air traf® c
control and seismic data recordings. Both the FDR and the
CVR recordings showed nothing abnormal prior to the
recordings abruptly ceasing at 19.02:50hrs. There was a
sudden loud sound on the CVR area microphone track
immediately prior to the end of the recording but the
characteristics of the cut-off wave form were consistentwith
a power supply failure. The nature of the wave form
associated with the noise at the very end of the recording
was examined in great detail in an attempt to determine
whether it was characteristic of a violent rise in pressure that
would accompany the detonation of an explosive device.
After considerable study it was concluded that it was not
possible to resolve the issue with the knowledge that was
available at that time. This issue became the subject of a
recommendation in the ® nal report with a call for research to
be conducted to determine whether it was possible to
identify the source of the ® nal noise on the Lockerbie CVR
recording and any similar explosive event in an aircraft
fuselage. The Flight Data Recorder was of a type that
recorded directly onto the recording medium without the
data being temporarily stored in a volatile buffer store. Data
was therefore available right up until the power supplies to
the recorder failed. The latest designs of ¯ ight recorders
use `buffers’ to store data for up to 0.5 seconds after
sampling. If the power supplies are lost on these recorders
all the data in the buffer is erased. To ensure that vital
information is not lost in this process, a recommendation
was made that recorder speci® cations should include a
requirement that recording systems employing `buffers’
should have non-volatile memories.
INITIAL EXAMINATIONS OF THE WRECKAGE
Over a period of weeks following the disaster the
wreckage was recovered from the very large area covered
by the wreckage trails. It was then transported to a large
hangar at a military establishment south of Lockerbie where
the initial examinations and a two-dimensional reconstruc-
tion of the aircraft was carried out. In parallel, following the
discovery of the blast-damaged structural element from the
baggage container, the remains of all 14 containers were
examined and those of particular interest were reconstructed
in three dimensions. This process allowed the site of the
explosive device to be established with accuracy within the
metal baggage container at position 14L in the aircraft’ s
forward baggage hold (Figure 2). It was during this process
that evidence was recovered which allowed the police to
establish that the improvised explosive device had been
placed within a speci® c type of radio-cassette recorder.
TRAJECTORY ANALYSIS AND DETAILED
EXAMINATION OF THE WRECKAGE
Some years before Lockerbie, the AAIB collaborated
with Cran® eld University in a project aimed at establishing
a computer model for trajectory paths adopted by key items
of wreckage in airborne structural failure cases. The
technique, known as trajectory analysis, enabled the AAIB
investigators to establish the reasons for the two separate
wreckage trails at Lockerbie and assisted in the under-
standing of the sequence of the break-up of the Boeing 747.
The narrow northern trail was shown to be formed by debris
released in the aircraft’ s near vertical dive between 19,000
and 9,000 feet overhead Lockerbie. The very much longer
southern trail appeared to have been created by wreckage
released during the initial disintegration at altitude whilst
the aircraft was in level ¯ ight. Those items falling close to
Lockerbie had very much higher density than the lighter
components recovered further to the east. The lights
components, which included light structure and aluminized
soundproo® ng material, were recovered some 80 miles
away near the east coast of England.
During the examination of the Lockerbie wreckage in the
two-dimensional layout, many areas of remote damage were
identi® ed that could not be explained as direct effects of the
explosive device. It was then decided that a three-dimensional
reconstruction should be made of the fuselage structure
surrounding the explosive device. This work was done at the
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Figure 2. Baggage container identi® cation and location forward cargo hold.
AAIB wreckage analysis facility at Farnborough with the
objective of establishing the sequence of events immedi-
ately following the detonation of the device. A section of the
wreckage which included the whole of the forward baggage
compartment was removed to Farnborough and recon-
structed in three dimensions.
The trajectory analysis had enabled the sequence of
separation from the aircraft structure to be established and
examinationof the structure and the components themselves
gave an indication of how they had behaved during that
separation process. The sequence of events established was
as follows (Figure 3):
· The initial explosion triggered a sequence of events which
effectively destroyed the structural integrity of the forward
fuselage. Little more then remained between stations 560
and 760 (approximately) than the window belts and the
cabin sidewall structure immediately above and below the
windows, although much of the cargo-hold ¯ oor structure
appears to have remained brie¯ y attached to the aircraft.
· The main portion of the aircraft simultaneously entered a
manoeuvre involving a marked nose down and left roll
attitude change, probably as a result of inputs applied to the
¯ ying control cables by movement of structure.
· Failure of the left window belt then occurred, probably in
the region of station 710, as a result of torsional and bending
loads on the fuselage imparted by the manoeuvre (i.e., the
movement of the forward fuselage relative to the remainder
of the aircraft was an initial twisting motion to the right,
accompanied by a nose up pitching de¯ ection).
· The forward fuselage de¯ ected to the right, pivoting about
the starboard window belt, and then peeled away from the
structure at station 800. During this process the lower nose
section struck the No. 3 engine intake causing the engine to
detach from its pylon. This fuselage separation was
apparently complete within three seconds of the explosion.
· Structure and contents of the forward fuselage struck the
tail surfaces contributing to the destruction of the outboard
starboard tail plane and causing substantial damage to the
port unit. This damage occurred approximately 600 metres
track distance after the explosion and therefore appears to
have happened after the fuselage separation was complete.
· Fuselage structure continued to break away from the
aircraft and the separated forward fuselage section as they
descended.
· The aircraft maintained a steepening descent path until it
reached the vertical in the region of 19,000 feet approxi-
mately over the ® nal impact point. Shortly before it did so
the tail ® n began to disintegrate.
· The mode of failure of the ® n was not clear; however,
¯ utter of its structure was suspected.
· Once established in the vertical dive, the ® n torque box
continued to disintegrate, possibly permitting the remainder
of the aircraft to yaw suf® ciently to cause side load
separation in No.s 1, 3 and 4 engines, complete with their
pylons.
· Break-up of the rear fuselage occurred during the vertical
descent, possibly as a result of loads induced by the yaw,
leaving a section of cabin ¯ oor and baggage hold from
approximately stations 1241 and 1920, together with three
landing gear units, to fall onto housing in Rosebank Terrace
in the town of Lockerbie.
· The main wing structure struck the ground with a high
yaw angle in Sherwood Crescent in the town of Lockerbie.
THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT DAMAGE TO THE
STRUCTURE
Although the sequence of disintegration and direct
explosive damage was well understood, there remained a
dif® culty in explaining the damage at sites remote from the
site of the explosion. There were no three-dimensional
modelling techniques available to simulate the effects of
blast on the relatively complex structure of the Boeing 747
fuselage. The AAIB analysis detailed in the of® cial accident
report was therefore necessarily restricted to a qualitative
consideration of the processes that led to the break-up of Pan
Am Flight 103. It also concentrated on those aspects that
would be critical to understand in order to provide
protection against any future attempt to detonate high
explosive within an aircraft pressure hull.
The direct damage to the structure was caused by the
propagation of the spherical shock wave as it expanded from
the centre of the detonation close to the fuselage side of the
baggage container. The baggage within the container to some
extent `focused’ the explosive forces towards the fuselage side
in an outboard and downwards direction. This shattered the
fuselage skin to produce a hole of approximately 50 cm
diameter with a very characteristic jagged edge. This
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Figure 3. Fuselage initial damage sequence (schematic representation).
relatively small hole was rapidly enlarged to some 5.2m ´
1.5m by the secondary high pressure wave caused by the
refection off the baggage surrounding the device and by the
general pressure rise associated with the chemical conversion
of solid explosive material into high temperature gas. A star-
shaped pattern of cracks ran from this large hole and one
longitudinal fracture propagated forward to station 480 and
rearward to the wing box, a crack of some 13m in length.
The indirect damage to the structure was evident at many
remote sites all indicative of localized explosive shocks or
overpressures on the internal surfaces of the hull. These
areas of damage were caused by the generation of `Mach
stem’ shock waves which were channelled to the remote
sites via the many natural `ducts’ within the aircraft
structure (Figure 4). A Mach stem shock wave is formed
by the interaction between the incident and re¯ ected shock
waves which produces a new single shock wave which can
have pressures and velocities of propagation greater than
that of the incident wave (Figure 5). The cavities between
the structural frames, and those between the baggage
compartment lining and the containers, provide a ready-
made system of interlinking `ducts’ for the Mach stem
shock waves which appear to combine and reinforce to
create localized areas of serious structural damage. The
combined effect of the direct and indirect forces was
suf® cient to destroy the structural integrity of the forward
fuselage and allow the nose and ¯ ight deck section to detach
within a period of two to three seconds, with the inevitable
break-up of the remainder of the aircraft.
THE TECHNICAL REPORT AND SAFETY
RECOMMENDATIONS
The AAIB report into the Lockerbie disaster was
published on 11 September 1990. It contained a number
of far-reaching safety recommendations aimed at ensuring
that vital evidence is available in the aftermath of any
aircraft accident and providing aircraft with a range of
mechanisms for protecting the structure and essential
systems from the effects of explosive forces. The safety
recommendations are reproduced below:
· Recommendation 4.1: That manufacturers of existing
recorders which use buffering techniques give consideration
to making the buffers non-volatile, and the data recoverable
after power loss.
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Figure 4. Network of interlinked cavities formed within forward fuselage structure and baggage hold (schematic representation).
· Recommendation 4.2: That Airworthiness Authorities re-
consider the concept of allowing buffered data to be stored
in a volatile memory.
· Recommendation 4.3: That Airworthiness Authorities
consider requiring the CVR system to contain a short
duration, i.e., no greater than one minute, back-up power
supply to enable the CVR to respond to events that result in
the almost immediate loss of the aircraft’ s electrical power
supply.
· Recommendation 4.4: That the Department of Transport
fund a study to devise methods of recording violent positive
and negative pressure pulses, preferably utilizing the
aircraft’ s ¯ ight recorder systems.
· Recommendation4.5: That Airworthiness Authorities and
aircraft manufacturers undertake a systematic study with a
view to identifyingmeasures that might mitigate the effects
of explosive devices and improve the tolerability of aircraft
structure and systems to explosive damage.
THE SAFETY ACTION
The Civil Aviation Authority in the United Kingdom co-
ordinates the responses and implementation on all AAIB
Safety Recommendations. They publish an annual report
detailing the implementation achieved on all recommenda-
tions with continuing safety action. The Lockerbie report’ s
recommendations led to a wide range of national and
international research programmes aimed at providing
information for investigators in the immediate aftermath
of such an event and providing the aircraft with enhanced
protection against improvised explosive devices.
The ® rst two safety recommendations called for ¯ ight
data recorders to have non-volatile storage buffers such that
data would be available to investigators following the loss
of recorder power supplies. These recommendations were
accepted and EUROCAE (European Organization for Civil
Aviation Equipment) Working Group 21 agreed a require-
ment in their document ED-55 `Minimum Operational
Performance Speci® cation for Flight Data Recorder Sys-
tems’ for the provision of protected storage when buffers
were used.
The third recommendation called for cockpit voice
recorders (CVRs) to incorporate a short duration back-up
power supply to ensure that the recording was not lost in the
event of a power supply disruption. This recommendation
was accepted and EUROCAE Working Group 18 (Audio
SystemsÐ CVRs) incorporated a requirement into its
speci® cations work programme.
The fourth recommendation called for the UK Depart-
ment of Transport to fund a study to establish whether the
aircraft’ s ¯ ight recorder systems could discriminate
between positive pressure pulses (explosive events) and
negative pressure pulses (decompressions). The Department
sponsored a research project with the Institute of Sound and
Vibration Research (ISVR) at Southampton University
which was completed in 1994. The ISVR Project Team
143THE LOCKERBIE INVESTIGATION
Trans IChemE, Vol 75, Part B, August 1997
Figure 5. Potential shock and explosive gas propagation paths (schematic representation).
were able to show that analysis of the spectral response from
the cockpit voice recording was able to discriminate
between structural failures caused by improvised explosive
devices and structural failures resulting from material
defects in the fuselage structure.
The ® nal recommendation was the most far-reaching and
involved a truly international research effort. It involved co-
ordinating the research being undertaken by the United
Kingdom, the USA, Canada, France and the Netherlands.
The UK has funded a four-year programme of theoretical
and experimental research into the effects of explosives on
typical aircraft structures and systems. This is being
undertaken by the Defence Research Agency in the UK.
Other work, including testing of fuselage sections and
baggage containers, is being undertaken by the other
airworthiness authorities mentioned above.
An ICAO Study GroupÐ Incorporation of Security into
Aircraft Design (ISAD) was also formed and has made some
18 proposals for international standards and recommended
practices concerning future design standards for aircraft.
The research effort to date has produced new designs for
baggage containers that absorb explosive energy, proposals
for new baggage bay lining materials that will be energy
absorbing and proposals for structural methods for alleviat-
ing the blast pressure pulses such that it limits any wider
structural damage.
The international research effort is continuing and
considerable progress is being made. This work, in
combination with the developments already taking place
in airport security systems, will go a long way to ensure that
disasters on the scale of Lockerbie never occur again.
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